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data were of interest (only) because they were thought to inform
this debate. This is true not only of the expert systems debate in
Artificial Intelligence, but in particular of the debate in the con-
text of language, from the longstanding controversy between rules
and connectionism prompted by Rumelhart and McClelland’s
(1986) model of the past tense to more recent contrasts between
grammars and data-oriented parsing (e.g., Bod 1998). Past pro-
posals of the rule/similarity distinction such as Hahn and Chater
(1998) have (successfully or not) sought to characterise the repre-
sentations and processes that might count as rules or similarity and
how they relate to data. The proposed distinction in the target ar-
ticle does more than turn this relationship on its head, in that pat-
terns of data are all that is to remain.
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Abstract: Unless restricted to explicitly held, sharable beliefs that control
and justify a person’s behavior, the notion of a rule has little value as an ex-
planatory concept. Similarity-based processing is a general characteristic
of the mind-world interface where internal processes (including explicitly
represented rules) act on the external world. The distinction between rules
and similarity is therefore misconceived.
In order to maintain a meaningful theoretical distinction between
two explanatory notions such as rules and similarity, it is necessary
to be clear about how the terms are to be used. As Pothos notes,
there has been much discussion about whether “similarity” can be
rendered as a useful theoretical notion (Goldstone 1994a; Good-
man 1972). Similar issues arise in defining the notion of a rule.
The prototypical notion of a rule is an explicit code that governs
conduct – a school rule or a traffic rule would be a good example.
A legal code, for example, is a set of rules that governs the behav-
ior of those working in the legal/justice system. In framing rules
of this kind, lawmakers are meeting three aims. First, they select
the relevant dimensions on which decisions and actions should be
based, thus ensuring that legal decisions are not based on preju-
diced or arbitrary grounds. Second, they provide a basis for the
public justification of legal decisions; the application of the rules
allows a judge to make explicit the grounds for a decision using de-
ductive logic. Third, an explicit set of rules allows for the sharing
of beliefs. Any competent member of the community can reason-
ably be expected to understand and apply the rules to their own
behavior. The rules provide the conceptual framework within
which appeals and argument can take place.
How can this central notion of a rule be applied to models of
cognitive psychology? An uncontroversial use of the notion would
be to consider rules as explicitly held beliefs that people use to di-
rect their actions. To spell a word correctly, I remember the rule
“i before e except after c.” To avoid a hangover, I apply the rule of
never drinking spirits after dinner. This sense of rule as explicitly
codified principle can be seen in a number of cognitive models.
RULEX (Nosofsky et al. 1989) is a good example: A learner clas-
sifies a set of stimuli by choosing an explicit rule, and then learns
to spot the individual exceptions. This type of learning is familiar
from the experience of learning a new language in the classroom,
where the teacher provides the rule for forming a past tense and
then the student learns the irregular exceptions. Until the student
becomes more fluent, she may explicitly apply the rule when
forming a sentence in the new language.
Where the notion of rule becomes problematic, and quite pos-
sibly empty, as an explanatory tool is when it is applied to describe
regularities in behavior of which the agent has no explicit knowl-
edge. In such cases (such as using the syntax of one’s native lan-
guage, or following the rules of social interaction in everyday con-
texts) the person can be said to be following a rule, but this is not
evidence that the rule itself is represented in the part of the mind/
brain directing the behavior. Behaving in a regular manner “as if”
following a rule is a property of many different types of system, in-
cluding physical systems with no mental representations at all.
Water flows downhill as a rule, but does not represent this rule in
itself. Rule-governed behavior is not sufficient evidence for a
model in which the internal representation of those rules has a
causal role in the production of the behavior.
I would propose then that the notion of “rule” in cognitive sci-
ence should be restricted to those rules that can be explicitly
stated by the person following the rule. (It then becomes an in-
teresting question whether the rule is causally efficacious or
merely used for post hoc justification.) Of course such a restric-
tion will be very constraining on the range of situations in which
we can explain behavior in terms of a rule. There are, however,
clear examples. Situations in which rules control behavior would
include the classic concept identification experiments conducted
by Bruner et al. (1956) and experiments on inductive reasoning
where rules have to be hypothesized to account for observed data
(Wason 1960). More recently, Ashby et al. (2002) have a range of
very telling dissociations between learning contexts that involve
explicit reasoning and those that use implicit associative learning,
and also have evidence that different brain systems are involved.
The danger of not restricting the notion of rule in this way is
that, effectively, any systematic cognitive process could be thought
to involve a rule. Short-term memory follows rules (most recent
items are recalled first); attention and perception work according
to rules – the notion of rule simply becomes the notion of an ob-
served regularity. No causal mechanism involving representation
of the rule can be implied.
Having restricted the meaning of “rule” narrowly enough for it
to have some distinct explanatory value, we can then ask whether
“similarity” is the best concept with which to describe other forms
of behavior that are not directly controlled by explicit rules. Here
again I find the notion problematic, and indeed the dichotomy be-
tween rules and similarity to be false. Consider how a rule is ap-
plied in a given situation. A rule generally has two parts: a condi-
tion that must be satisfied to trigger the rule, and an action that
follows once the rule has been triggered. In deciding whether the
triggering condition of a rule has been satisfied, it is inevitable that
similarity will be involved. Some situations will trigger the rule in
a clear prototypical fashion. Others will partially match the condi-
tions, and will result in slow and uncertain application of the rule.
A learner who has decided to follow the explicit rule of putting all
red blocks in one pile and all orange blocks in another will need
to use similarity judgments when faced with colors intermediate
between red and orange. Generally speaking, with the exception
of artificial microworlds such as chess or baseball, there will always
be the potential for vagueness and uncertainty in how the rule ap-
plies to an individual case. All processes that involve the interface
between internal processes and the external world will exhibit
similarity-based effects, regardless of whether explicit rules are in-
volved or not.
Commentary/Pothos: The rules versus similarity distinction
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